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The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United
International Holdings, Inc.: The
Supreme Court Breaks Old Ground
Mark J. Loewenstein *
This article analyzes the Supreme Court's decision to decide
only one federal securities law case, The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd.
v. United International Holdings, Inc. On the face of it, the Court
simply affirmed long-standing, uncontroversial tenets of Rule
1 Ob-5. However, the article provides different explanations to
the Court's decision.

Introduction
In its 2000-01 Term, the United States Supreme Court decided
one federal securities law case, The Whaif (Holdings) Ltd. v. United
International Holdings, Inc. 1 The fact that the Court took only one
securities law case is unremarkable. Its decision to take this case,
however, and the outcome it reached are somewhat remarkable.
This is not because the Court altered existing law or resolved a
conflict among the circuits, but rather just the opposite: the Court
took an uncontroversial case that raised no novel issues, and
unanimously affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit."2 One might then reasonably inquire as to why the
Court granted certiorari in this case. I will return to that question in
the conclusion to this article.
Wharf involved an oral option contract between plaintiff and defendant, pursuant to which defendant orally agreed to sell to plaintiff
10% of the stock of a new cable system in Hong Kong that defendant was developing, in consideration for consulting services that
*Mark J. Loewenstein is a Professor of Law, University of Colorado School
of Law, Boulder, Colorado.
1
"

121 S.Ct. 1776 (2001).

2

The Tenth Circuit decision is reported at 210 F.2d 1207 (lOth Cir. 2000).
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plaintiff was providing for the cable system."3 Although plaintiff
sought to exercise the option, defendant refused to accept plaintiff's
payment or issue the stock. 4 Plaintiff brought suit under Rule 10b-5
(and various state law claims), alleging that defendant fraudulently
misrepresented that plaintiff could acquire stock pursuant to the option. In fa9t, plaintiff alleged, defendant never intended to honor the
option contract. As the option contract constituted a contract to sell
a security, the Court held that defendant's misrepresentations were
made in connection with the sale of a security and thus actionable
under Rule 10b-5.
The plaintiff prevailed in a trial before a jury, which awarded it
$67 million in compensatory damages and $58.5 million in punitive
damages on the state-law claims. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed. 5 There were two issues before Court: first, whether an oral agreement can be the basis
for a claim under Rule 1Ob-5; and second, whether an undisclosed
reservation not to permit the exercise of an option falls outside of
§ 1O(b) (and, hence, Rule 1Ob-5) because the misrepresentation
does not relate to the value of the security and therefore does not
implicate § 1O(b)' s policy of full disclosure.

The Issues in Wharf
Oral Contract Within Antifraud Provisions
The Court was little troubled by either issue. On the argument
that an oral agreement is outside the purview of a Rule 10b-5 claim,
the Court found nothing in the securities acts or its own precedents
to support the defendant's position. The Court noted that oral
contracts for the sale of securities are ''sufficiently common that the
Uniform Commercial Code and statutes of fraud in every State now
consider them enforceable.' ' 6 The Court also noted that excepting
oral contracts from the coverage of the Securities and Exchange Act

"

3

121 S.Ct. at 1779.

4

Id.

5

Id. at 1780.

6

Id. at 1781, citing U.C.C. § 8-113 (Supp. 2000).
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of 1934 "would significantly limit the Act's coverage, thereby
undermining its basic purposes.' ' 7
Rule 10b-5 Covers Misrepresentations Regarding
Intentions
On defendant's second argument- that Rule 10b-5 did not
forbid misrepresentations regarding defendant's intentions- the
Court decided that this sort of misrepresentation is actionable. Defendant was essentially claiming that its misrepresentation did not
go to the value of the security and that disputes over the ownership
of securities are not actionable under Rule 1Ob-5. The Court
responded that a misrepresentation relating to defendant's intentions did affect the value: "[s]ince [defendant] did not intend to
honor the option, the option was, unbeknownst to [plaintifl:], valueless.''8 Thus, this dispute was over more than mere ownership. 9
Several observations about this case center on this second argument. First, although not critical to the outcome of the case, the
Court's last-quoted statement was obviously incorrect. Even if the
defendant did not intend to honor the option, the option still had
value. Plaintiff may not have paid as much, knowing it might have
to litigate to perfect its rights, but surely the contract right it acquired
was not valueless. A cynic might say, noting the considerable damages that plaintiff recovered, that plaintiff underpaid for its option.
Deception Within Antifraud Rule
Second, the case did not really involve an active misrepresentation. Rather, the defendant had a "secret reservation" (that it would
not honor its contractual commitment), which the Court simply
characterized as a misrepresentation. The Court supported this
characterization with a citation to a comment to § 530 of theRestatement (Second) of Torts that indicates that a promise made
without an intention to perform is ''fraudulent.' ' 10 By relying on the
Restatement of Torts, the Court avoided analysis under its established Rule 1Ob-5 jurisprudence. Traditionally, the failure to disclose (in this case that the defendant did not intend to honor the
7

Id.

8

Id. at 1782.

9

Id.

10

ld.
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agreement) is only fraudulent if there is a duty to disclose. In
Chiarella v. United States/ 1 the Court held that an employee of a
printer had no duty to the sellers of stock to disclose the nonpublic
information that he had acquired through his employment and,
therefore, his failure to disclose (or to refrain from trading) could
not constitute a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
under § 1O(b ). Similarly, in Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 12 the Court held that a financial analyst who passed along to
his clients nonpublic information about a company that he received
from an officer of the company did not violate § 1O(b) or Rule
1Ob-5, because the officer who disclosed the information to the
analyst did not breach any fiduciary duty to the company in making
the disclosure and, therefore, the analyst could not have a breached
a fiduciary duty.
Applying Chiarella and Dirks to the facts of Wharf suggests that
the defendant in Wharfviolated Rule 10b-5 only if it had a duty to
disclose its intention not to honor its contractual commitment. In
fact, it had no such duty. The source of this duty could not be a fiduciary duty, as parties contracting with one another at arm's length
(as were these parties) generally do not owe fiduciary duties to one
another, nor could the duty arise under general notions of good faith
and fair dealing, as this duty generally arises only after the parties
have contracted. Thus, defendant's liability for securities fraud turns
not on a failure to disclose or an active misrepresentation, but rather
on the notion that defendant's conduct falls within the tort of deceit
and, therefore, violates Rule 10b-5. 13
This conclusion is not remarkable and is consistent with United
States v. 0 'Hagan, 14 the Court's most recent pronouncement on
Rule 10b-5. In O'Hagan, the Court upheld the defendant's securities fraud conviction even though the ''defrauded'' party was not
the seller of the securities, but defendant's client. Defendant was a
lawyer whose firm represented the bidder in a hostile takeover. In
advance of the bid, defendant purchased securities in the target

u.s. 222 (1980).

11

445

12

463 U.S. 646 (1983).

13

That Rule 1Ob-5 covers conduct other than misrepresentations seems uncontroversial. United States v. 0 'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997), discussed in
the text, did not involve a misrepresentation or a failure to disclose. Similarly,
cases such as Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361 (7th Cir. 1983),
involving a claim of churning by a broker, do not involve misrepresentations.
14

521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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company. Because defendant was not an insider of the target, he
owed no fiduciary duty to the target company or its shareholders. As
a partner in the law firm that represented the bidder, however, defendant did owe a fiduciary duty to the bidder not to misappropriate
the confidential information that had been entrusted to him. His misappropriation, the Court concluded, was a fraud on his client, which
fraud was ''in connection with'' his purchase of securities and thus
a violation of Rule 10b-5.

"In Connection Requirement" Not Expressly
Considered
This raises a final aspect of Wharf· the Court avoided a potentially
troubling ''in connection with'' issue when it decided that the ''misrepresentation" did go to the value of the security. In O'Hagan, the
Court found that defendant's fraud on his client was connected
closely enough with his securities transactions to be ''in connection
with'' those transactions. In Wharf, the Court might have considered
whether plaintiff would still have a claim if defendant's misrepresentation was clearly collateral to the value of the security, as arguably it was. If, for instance, defendant had represented (falsely) to
plaintiff that plaintiff's stock acquisition would enhance plaintiff's
reputation in the cable industry and on the basis of that misrepresentation plaintiff purchased the option, would plaintiff be able to bring
a claim under Rule 10b-5?15
The ''in connection with'' requirement of Rule 1Ob-5 is one of
the murkier areas of the Rule's jurisprudence. 16 The Court's 1971
decision in Superintendent ofInsurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 17 and its more recent decision in 0 'Hagan, give a liberal reading to the ''in connection with'' requirement, insisting only that the
fraud "touch" upon the sale of securities for the Rule to be applicable. More to the point, lower court cases have rejected the no15

Even this representation arguably goes to value, as plaintiff might claim
that a security that enhances its reputation is more valuable to it than one that
does not.
16

See, e.g., James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman and Donald C. Langevoort,
SECURITIES REGULATION at 710 (3d ed. 2001)("Unfortunately, the 'in
connection with' standard is little understood, and a close look at the cases
that have invoked it shows no consistent judicial treatment or prevailing
interpretive principle.'')
17

404 U.S. 6 (1971).
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tion that the misrepresentation must go to the value of the security. 18
In any case, the Court seems to have intentionally avoided revisiting
the "in connection with" question in this case. By avoiding this issue, and relying on the tort of deceit, the Court's decision in Wharf
is simply that an intentional misrepresentation by a seller of a security that relates to the value of the security being sold violates Rule
10b-5. This is hardly a controversial conclusion and is indeed ''old
ground.''

Conclusion
Inasmuch as the Court simply affirmed long-standing, uncontroversial tenets of Rule 1Ob-5, why did it take the case? One might
speculate that it took the case because defendant's misrepresentation did seem collateral to the value of the security and thus did
raise an "in connection with" issue worth considering, especially if
the Court was looking to restrict the reach of Rule 1Ob-5. Then, one
might speculate, the justices became convinced, as Justice Breyer
stated in the opinion, that the misrepresentation did affect the value
of the security, thus mooting the issue. So what seemed like a case
with a meaty issue turned into one with no issue at all.
A second possible explanation - and one directly contrary to the
first - is that the Court is signaling a renewed respect for Rule
10b-5. In a series of decisions, starting with Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores 19 in 1975 and culminating with Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver20 in 1994, the Court
systematically and consciously trimmed back the scope of Rule
10b-5, but may now be reversing that trend. O'Hagan, and now
Wharf, both represented opportunities to further limit the scope of
the Rule. Wharf seemed like a good vehicle to do that, especially
because the case seemed more like a state claim for breach of
18

E.g., SEC v. Jakubowski, 150 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1998)(lawyer committed
securities fraud by misrepresenting the identity of the purchaser of the securities); Threadgill v. Black, 730 F.2d 810, 811-12 (D.C. Cir. 1984)("fraud in
the purchase or sale includes 'entering into a contract of sale with the secret
reservation not to fully perform. '")(citing Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476
F.2d 393, 396 (9th Cir. 1973)); A.T Brad & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397
(2d Cir. 1967)(customer's misrepresentation that he would pay for stock when
his intention was to pay only if it increased in value violated§ 10(b)).

u.s. 723 (1975).

19

421

20

511 U.S. 164 (1994)
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contract than a federal securities fraud case. So characterized, the
case seemed to fit within the Court's philosophy that the federal
courts ought not to recognize an implied cause of action under
federal statutes when there is an adequate state law remedy. 21 By not
taking that stance, it is clear that Rule lOb-5 remains an important
antifraud claim, not to be displaced by state law remedies.
As between these competing explanations of the Wharf case, the
first seems to be the more plausible. It seems unlikely, as the second
rationale requires, that the Court would consciously engage in
signaling in this area. What purpose would it serve - to encourage
skittish plaintiffs to file securities fraud claims? Moreover, it is
doubtful that the Court is looking to increase the role of the federal
courts. Indeed, its decision in the same term in the case of Alexander v. Sandoval, 22 in which it refused to recognize an implied cause
of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, clearly
"signals" that the Court's distaste for implied causes of action
continues.
21

Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)(plaintiff's claim, essentially alleging a breach of fiduciary duty, could not be maintained as a securities fraud claim).
22
121 S.Ct. 1511 (2001)(holding that there is no private right of action to
enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of Civil
Rights Act of 1964).

